plugin/dnssec: on delegation, sign DS or NSEC of no DS. (#5899)

* When returning NS for delegation point, we sign any DS Record or if not found we generate a NSEC proving absence of DS. This follow behaviour describe in rfc4035 (Section 3.1.4) * DS request at apex behave as before. * Fix edge case of requesting NSEC which prove that NSEC does not exist. Signed-off-by: Jeremiejig <me@jeremiejig.fr>
2025-10-27 08:14:18 -04:00 · 2023-04-22 22:32:01 +02:00
parent 0862dd1cb5
commit 13e66918e3
5 changed files with 365 additions and 9 deletions
--- a/plugin/dnssec/black_lies.go
+++ b/plugin/dnssec/black_lies.go
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 package dnssec

 import (
+	"strings"
+
 	"github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/response"
 	"github.com/coredns/coredns/request"

@@ -11,15 +13,27 @@ import (
 // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-valsorda-dnsop-black-lies-00
 // For example, a request for the non-existing name a.example.com would
 // cause the following NSEC record to be generated:
+//
 //	a.example.com. 3600 IN NSEC \000.a.example.com. ( RRSIG NSEC ... )
+//
 // This inturn makes every NXDOMAIN answer a NODATA one, don't forget to flip
 // the header rcode to NOERROR.
 func (d Dnssec) nsec(state request.Request, mt response.Type, ttl, incep, expir uint32, server string) ([]dns.RR, error) {
 	nsec := &dns.NSEC{}
 	nsec.Hdr = dns.RR_Header{Name: state.QName(), Ttl: ttl, Class: dns.ClassINET, Rrtype: dns.TypeNSEC}
 	nsec.NextDomain = "\\000." + state.QName()
+	if state.QName() == "." {
+		nsec.NextDomain = "\\000." // If You want to play as root server
+	}
 	if state.Name() == state.Zone {
 		nsec.TypeBitMap = filter18(state.QType(), apexBitmap, mt)
+	} else if mt == response.Delegation || state.QType() == dns.TypeDS {
+		nsec.TypeBitMap = delegationBitmap[:]
+		if mt == response.Delegation {
+			labels := dns.SplitDomainName(state.QName())
+			labels[0] += "\\000"
+			nsec.NextDomain = strings.Join(labels, ".") + "."
+		}
 	} else {
 		nsec.TypeBitMap = filter14(state.QType(), zoneBitmap, mt)
 	}
@@ -34,13 +48,14 @@ func (d Dnssec) nsec(state request.Request, mt response.Type, ttl, incep, expir

 // The NSEC bit maps we return.
 var (
-	zoneBitmap = [...]uint16{dns.TypeA, dns.TypeHINFO, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeAAAA, dns.TypeLOC, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCERT, dns.TypeSSHFP, dns.TypeRRSIG, dns.TypeNSEC, dns.TypeTLSA, dns.TypeHIP, dns.TypeOPENPGPKEY, dns.TypeSPF}
-	apexBitmap = [...]uint16{dns.TypeA, dns.TypeNS, dns.TypeSOA, dns.TypeHINFO, dns.TypeMX, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeAAAA, dns.TypeLOC, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCERT, dns.TypeSSHFP, dns.TypeRRSIG, dns.TypeNSEC, dns.TypeDNSKEY, dns.TypeTLSA, dns.TypeHIP, dns.TypeOPENPGPKEY, dns.TypeSPF}
+	delegationBitmap = [...]uint16{dns.TypeA, dns.TypeNS, dns.TypeHINFO, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeAAAA, dns.TypeLOC, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCERT, dns.TypeSSHFP, dns.TypeRRSIG, dns.TypeNSEC, dns.TypeTLSA, dns.TypeHIP, dns.TypeOPENPGPKEY, dns.TypeSPF}
+	zoneBitmap       = [...]uint16{dns.TypeA, dns.TypeHINFO, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeAAAA, dns.TypeLOC, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCERT, dns.TypeSSHFP, dns.TypeRRSIG, dns.TypeNSEC, dns.TypeTLSA, dns.TypeHIP, dns.TypeOPENPGPKEY, dns.TypeSPF}
+	apexBitmap       = [...]uint16{dns.TypeA, dns.TypeNS, dns.TypeSOA, dns.TypeHINFO, dns.TypeMX, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeAAAA, dns.TypeLOC, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCERT, dns.TypeSSHFP, dns.TypeRRSIG, dns.TypeNSEC, dns.TypeDNSKEY, dns.TypeTLSA, dns.TypeHIP, dns.TypeOPENPGPKEY, dns.TypeSPF}
 )

 // filter14 filters out t from bitmap (if it exists). If mt is not an NODATA response, just return the entire bitmap.
 func filter14(t uint16, bitmap [14]uint16, mt response.Type) []uint16 {
-	if mt != response.NoData && mt != response.NameError {
+	if mt != response.NoData && mt != response.NameError || t == dns.TypeNSEC {
 		return zoneBitmap[:]
 	}
 	for i := range bitmap {
@@ -52,7 +67,7 @@ func filter14(t uint16, bitmap [14]uint16, mt response.Type) []uint16 {
 }

 func filter18(t uint16, bitmap [18]uint16, mt response.Type) []uint16 {
-	if mt != response.NoData && mt != response.NameError {
+	if mt != response.NoData && mt != response.NameError || t == dns.TypeNSEC {
 		return apexBitmap[:]
 	}
 	for i := range bitmap {
--- a/plugin/dnssec/black_lies_test.go
+++ b/plugin/dnssec/black_lies_test.go
@@ -71,16 +71,188 @@ func TestBlackLiesNoError(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestBlackLiesApexNsec(t *testing.T) {
+	d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
+	defer rm1()
+	defer rm2()
+
+	m := testNsecMsg()
+	m.SetQuestion("miek.nl.", dns.TypeNSEC)
+	state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
+	m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
+	if len(m.Ns) > 0 {
+		t.Error("Authority section should be empty")
+	}
+	if len(m.Answer) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("Answer section should have 2 RRs")
+	}
+	sig, nsec := false, false
+	for _, rr := range m.Answer {
+		if _, ok := rr.(*dns.RRSIG); ok {
+			sig = true
+		}
+		if rnsec, ok := rr.(*dns.NSEC); ok {
+			nsec = true
+			var bitpresent uint
+			for _, typeBit := range rnsec.TypeBitMap {
+				switch typeBit {
+				case dns.TypeSOA:
+					bitpresent |= 4
+				case dns.TypeNSEC:
+					bitpresent |= 1
+				case dns.TypeRRSIG:
+					bitpresent |= 2
+				}
+			}
+			if bitpresent != 7 {
+				t.Error("NSEC must have SOA, RRSIG and NSEC in its bitmap")
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !sig || !nsec {
+		t.Errorf("Expected RRSIG and NSEC in answer section")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBlackLiesNsec(t *testing.T) {
+	d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
+	defer rm1()
+	defer rm2()
+
+	m := testNsecMsg()
+	m.SetQuestion("www.miek.nl.", dns.TypeNSEC)
+	state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
+	m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
+	if len(m.Ns) > 0 {
+		t.Error("Authority section should be empty")
+	}
+	if len(m.Answer) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("Answer section should have 2 RRs")
+	}
+	sig, nsec := false, false
+	for _, rr := range m.Answer {
+		if _, ok := rr.(*dns.RRSIG); ok {
+			sig = true
+		}
+		if rnsec, ok := rr.(*dns.NSEC); ok {
+			nsec = true
+			var bitpresent uint
+			for _, typeBit := range rnsec.TypeBitMap {
+				switch typeBit {
+				case dns.TypeNSEC:
+					bitpresent |= 1
+				case dns.TypeRRSIG:
+					bitpresent |= 2
+				}
+			}
+			if bitpresent != 3 {
+				t.Error("NSEC must have RRSIG and NSEC in its bitmap")
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if !sig || !nsec {
+		t.Errorf("Expected RRSIG and NSEC in answer section")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBlackLiesApexDS(t *testing.T) {
+	d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
+	defer rm1()
+	defer rm2()
+
+	m := testApexDSMsg()
+	m.SetQuestion("miek.nl.", dns.TypeDS)
+	state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
+	m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
+	if !section(m.Ns, 2) {
+		t.Errorf("Authority section should have 2 sigs")
+	}
+	var nsec *dns.NSEC
+	for _, r := range m.Ns {
+		if r.Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeNSEC {
+			nsec = r.(*dns.NSEC)
+		}
+	}
+	if nsec == nil {
+		t.Error("Expected NSEC, got none")
+	} else if correctNsecForDS(nsec) {
+		t.Error("NSEC DS at the apex zone should cover all apex type.")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBlackLiesDS(t *testing.T) {
+	d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
+	defer rm1()
+	defer rm2()
+
+	m := testApexDSMsg()
+	m.SetQuestion("sub.miek.nl.", dns.TypeDS)
+	state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
+	m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
+	if !section(m.Ns, 2) {
+		t.Errorf("Authority section should have 2 sigs")
+	}
+	var nsec *dns.NSEC
+	for _, r := range m.Ns {
+		if r.Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeNSEC {
+			nsec = r.(*dns.NSEC)
+		}
+	}
+	if nsec == nil {
+		t.Error("Expected NSEC, got none")
+	} else if !correctNsecForDS(nsec) {
+		t.Error("NSEC DS should cover delegation type only.")
+	}
+}
+
+func correctNsecForDS(nsec *dns.NSEC) bool {
+	var bitmask uint
+	/* Coherent TypeBitMap for NSEC of DS should contain at least:
+	 * {TypeNS, TypeNSEC, TypeRRSIG} and no SOA.
+	 * Any missing type will confuse resolver because
+	 * it will prove that the dns query cannot be a delegation point,
+	 * which will break trust resolution for unsigned delegated domain.
+	 * No SOA is obvious for none apex query.
+	 */
+	for _, typeBitmask := range nsec.TypeBitMap {
+		switch typeBitmask {
+		case dns.TypeNS:
+			bitmask |= 1
+		case dns.TypeNSEC:
+			bitmask |= 2
+		case dns.TypeRRSIG:
+			bitmask |= 4
+		case dns.TypeSOA:
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return bitmask == 7
+}
+
 func testNxdomainMsg() *dns.Msg {
 	return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeNameError},
 		Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "ww.miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeTXT}},
-		Ns: []dns.RR{test.SOA("miek.nl.	1800	IN	SOA	linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1461471181 14400 3600 604800 14400")},
+		Ns:       []dns.RR{test.SOA("miek.nl.	1800	IN	SOA	linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1461471181 14400 3600 604800 14400")},
 	}
 }

 func testSuccessMsg() *dns.Msg {
 	return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeSuccess},
 		Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "www.miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeTXT}},
-		Answer: []dns.RR{test.TXT(`www.miek.nl.	1800	IN	TXT	"response"`)},
+		Answer:   []dns.RR{test.TXT(`www.miek.nl.	1800	IN	TXT	"response"`)},
+	}
+}
+
+func testNsecMsg() *dns.Msg {
+	return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeNameError},
+		Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "www.miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeNSEC}},
+		Ns:       []dns.RR{test.SOA("miek.nl.	1800	IN	SOA	linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1461471181 14400 3600 604800 14400")},
+	}
+}
+
+func testApexDSMsg() *dns.Msg {
+	return &dns.Msg{MsgHdr: dns.MsgHdr{Rcode: dns.RcodeNameError},
+		Question: []dns.Question{{Name: "miek.nl.", Qclass: dns.ClassINET, Qtype: dns.TypeDS}},
+		Ns:       []dns.RR{test.SOA("miek.nl.	1800	IN	SOA	linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1461471181 14400 3600 604800 14400")},
 	}
 }
--- a/plugin/dnssec/dnssec.go
+++ b/plugin/dnssec/dnssec.go
@@ -48,6 +48,22 @@ func (d Dnssec) Sign(state request.Request, now time.Time, server string) *dns.M

 	mt, _ := response.Typify(req, time.Now().UTC()) // TODO(miek): need opt record here?
 	if mt == response.Delegation {
+		// We either sign DS or NSEC of DS.
+		ttl := req.Ns[0].Header().Ttl
+
+		ds := []dns.RR{}
+		for i := range req.Ns {
+			if req.Ns[i].Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeDS {
+				ds = append(ds, req.Ns[i])
+			}
+		}
+		if len(ds) == 0 {
+			if sigs, err := d.nsec(state, mt, ttl, incep, expir, server); err == nil {
+				req.Ns = append(req.Ns, sigs...)
+			}
+		} else if sigs, err := d.sign(ds, state.Zone, ttl, incep, expir, server); err == nil {
+			req.Ns = append(req.Ns, sigs...)
+		}
 		return req
 	}

@@ -66,6 +82,10 @@ func (d Dnssec) Sign(state request.Request, now time.Time, server string) *dns.M
 		}
 		if len(req.Ns) > 1 { // actually added nsec and sigs, reset the rcode
 			req.Rcode = dns.RcodeSuccess
+			if state.QType() == dns.TypeNSEC { // If original query was NSEC move Ns to Answer without SOA
+				req.Answer = req.Ns[len(req.Ns)-2 : len(req.Ns)]
+				req.Ns = nil
+			}
 		}
 		return req
 	}
--- a/plugin/dnssec/dnssec_test.go
+++ b/plugin/dnssec/dnssec_test.go
@@ -123,6 +123,60 @@ func TestSigningEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }

+func TestDelegationSigned(t *testing.T) {
+	d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
+	defer rm1()
+	defer rm2()
+
+	m := testMsgDelegationSigned()
+	m.SetQuestion("sub.miek.nl.", dns.TypeNS)
+	state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
+	m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
+	if !section(m.Ns, 1) {
+		t.Errorf("Authority section should have 1 RRSIGs")
+	}
+	if !section(m.Extra, 0) {
+		t.Error("Extra section should not have RRSIGs")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDelegationUnSigned(t *testing.T) {
+	d, rm1, rm2 := newDnssec(t, []string{"miek.nl."})
+	defer rm1()
+	defer rm2()
+
+	m := testMsgDelegationUnSigned()
+	m.SetQuestion("sub.miek.nl.", dns.TypeNS)
+	state := request.Request{Req: m, Zone: "miek.nl."}
+	m = d.Sign(state, time.Now().UTC(), server)
+	if !section(m.Ns, 1) {
+		t.Errorf("Authority section should have 1 RRSIG")
+	}
+	if !section(m.Extra, 0) {
+		t.Error("Extra section should not have RRSIG")
+	}
+	var nsec *dns.NSEC
+	var rrsig *dns.RRSIG
+	for _, r := range m.Ns {
+		if r.Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeNSEC {
+			nsec = r.(*dns.NSEC)
+		}
+		if r.Header().Rrtype == dns.TypeRRSIG {
+			rrsig = r.(*dns.RRSIG)
+		}
+	}
+	if nsec == nil {
+		t.Error("Authority section should hold a NSEC record")
+	}
+	if rrsig.TypeCovered != dns.TypeNSEC {
+		t.Errorf("RRSIG should cover type %s, got %s",
+			dns.TypeToString[dns.TypeNSEC], dns.TypeToString[rrsig.TypeCovered])
+	}
+	if !correctNsecForDS(nsec) {
+		t.Error("NSEC as invalid TypeBitMap for a DS")
+	}
+}
+
 func section(rss []dns.RR, nrSigs int) bool {
 	i := 0
 	for _, r := range rss {
@@ -137,13 +191,13 @@ func testMsg() *dns.Msg {
 	// don't care about the message header
 	return &dns.Msg{
 		Answer: []dns.RR{test.MX("miek.nl.	1703	IN	MX	1 aspmx.l.google.com.")},
-		Ns: []dns.RR{test.NS("miek.nl.	1703	IN	NS	omval.tednet.nl.")},
+		Ns:     []dns.RR{test.NS("miek.nl.	1703	IN	NS	omval.tednet.nl.")},
 	}
 }
 func testMsgEx() *dns.Msg {
 	return &dns.Msg{
 		Answer: []dns.RR{test.MX("example.org.	1703	IN	MX	1 aspmx.l.google.com.")},
-		Ns: []dns.RR{test.NS("example.org.	1703	IN	NS	omval.tednet.nl.")},
+		Ns:     []dns.RR{test.NS("example.org.	1703	IN	NS	omval.tednet.nl.")},
 	}
 }

@@ -163,6 +217,29 @@ func testMsgDname() *dns.Msg {
 	}
 }

+func testMsgDelegationSigned() *dns.Msg {
+	return &dns.Msg{
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.NS("sub.miek.nl.	1800	IN	NS	ns1.sub.miek.nl."),
+			test.DS("sub." + dsKey),
+		},
+		Extra: []dns.RR{
+			test.A("ns1.sub.miek.nl.	1800	IN	A	192.0.2.1"),
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func testMsgDelegationUnSigned() *dns.Msg {
+	return &dns.Msg{
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.NS("sub.miek.nl.	1800	IN	NS	ns1.sub.miek.nl."),
+		},
+		Extra: []dns.RR{
+			test.A("ns1.sub.miek.nl.	1800	IN	A	192.0.2.1"),
+		},
+	}
+}
+
 func testEmptyMsg() *dns.Msg {
 	// don't care about the message header
 	return &dns.Msg{
@@ -197,6 +274,7 @@ Created: 20160423195532
 Publish: 20160423195532
 Activate: 20160423195532
 `
+	dsKey    = `miek.nl. IN DS 18512 13 2 D4E806322598BC97A003EF1ACDFF352EEFF7B42DBB0D41B8224714C36AEF08D9`
 	pubKey1  = `example.org. IN DNSKEY 257 3 13 tVRWNSGpHZbCi7Pr7OmbADVUO3MxJ0Lb8Lk3o/HBHqCxf5K/J50lFqRa 98lkdAIiFOVRy8LyMvjwmxZKwB5MNw==`
 	privKey1 = `Private-key-format: v1.3
 Algorithm: 13 (ECDSAP256SHA256)
--- a/plugin/dnssec/handler_test.go
+++ b/plugin/dnssec/handler_test.go
@@ -37,6 +37,73 @@ var dnsTestCases = []test.Case{
 			test.DNSKEY("miek.nl.	3600	IN	DNSKEY	257 3 13 0J8u0XJ9GNGFEBXuAmLu04taHG4"),
 		},
 	},
+	{
+		Qname: "miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeNS, Do: true,
+		Answer: []dns.RR{
+			test.NS("miek.nl.	1800	IN      NS      linode.atoom.net."),
+			test.RRSIG("miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	NS 13 2 1800 20220101121212 20220201121212 18512 miek.nl. RandomNotChecked"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		Qname: "deleg.miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeNS, Do: true,
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.DS("deleg.miek.nl.	1800	IN      DS      18512 13 2 D4E806322598BC97A003EF1ACDFF352EEFF7B42DBB0D41B8224714C36AEF08D9"),
+			test.NS("deleg.miek.nl.	1800	IN      NS      ns01.deleg.miek.nl."),
+			test.RRSIG("deleg.miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	DS 13 3 1800 20220101121212 20220201121212 18512 miek.nl. RandomNotChecked"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		Qname: "unsigned.miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeNS, Do: true,
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.NS("unsigned.miek.nl.	1800	IN      NS      ns01.deleg.miek.nl."),
+			test.NSEC("unsigned.miek.nl.	1800	IN	NSEC	unsigned\\000.miek.nl. NS RRSIG NSEC"),
+			test.RRSIG("unsigned.miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	NSEC 13 3 1800 20220101121212 20220201121212 18512 miek.nl. RandomNotChecked"),
+		},
+	},
+	{ // DS should not come from dnssec plugin
+		Qname: "deleg.miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeDS,
+		Answer: []dns.RR{
+			test.DS("deleg.miek.nl.	1800	IN      DS      18512 13 2 D4E806322598BC97A003EF1ACDFF352EEFF7B42DBB0D41B8224714C36AEF08D9"),
+		},
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.NS("miek.nl.	1800	IN	NS	linode.atoom.net."),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		Qname: "unsigned.miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeDS,
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.SOA("miek.nl.	1800	IN	SOA	linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1282630057 14400 3600 604800 14400"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		Qname: "miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeDS, Do: true,
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.NSEC("miek.nl.	1800	IN	NSEC	\\000.miek.nl. A HINFO NS SOA MX TXT AAAA LOC SRV CERT SSHFP RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY TLSA HIP OPENPGPKEY SPF"),
+			test.RRSIG("miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	NSEC 13 2 1800 20220101121212 20220201121212 18512 miek.nl. RandomNotChecked"),
+			test.RRSIG("miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	SOA 13 2 3600 20171220141741 20171212111741 18512 miek.nl. 8bLTReqmuQtw=="),
+			test.SOA("miek.nl.	1800	IN	SOA	linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1282630057 14400 3600 604800 14400"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		Qname: "deleg.miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeDS, Do: true,
+		Answer: []dns.RR{
+			test.DS("deleg.miek.nl.	1800	IN      DS      18512 13 2 D4E806322598BC97A003EF1ACDFF352EEFF7B42DBB0D41B8224714C36AEF08D9"),
+			test.RRSIG("deleg.miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	DS 13 3 1800 20220101121212 20220201121212 18512 miek.nl. RandomNotChecked"),
+		},
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.NS("miek.nl.	1800	IN	NS	linode.atoom.net."),
+			test.RRSIG("miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	NS 13 2 3600 20161217114912 20161209084912 18512 miek.nl. ad9gA8VWgF1H8ze9/0Rk2Q=="),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		Qname: "unsigned.miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeDS, Do: true,
+		Ns: []dns.RR{
+			test.RRSIG("miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	SOA 13 2 3600 20171220141741 20171212111741 18512 miek.nl. 8bLTReqmuQtw=="),
+			test.SOA("miek.nl.	1800	IN	SOA	linode.atoom.net. miek.miek.nl. 1282630057 14400 3600 604800 14400"),
+			test.NSEC("unsigned.miek.nl.	1800	IN	NSEC	\\000.unsigned.miek.nl. NS RRSIG NSEC"),
+			test.RRSIG("unsigned.miek.nl.	1800	IN	RRSIG	NSEC 13 3 1800 20220101121212 20220201121212 18512 miek.nl. RandomNotChecked"),
+		},
+	},
 	{
 		Qname: "miek.nl.", Qtype: dns.TypeMX,
 		Answer: []dns.RR{
@@ -179,4 +246,8 @@ $ORIGIN miek.nl.

 a               IN      A       139.162.196.78
                IN      AAAA    2a01:7e00::f03c:91ff:fef1:6735
-www             IN      CNAME   a`
+www             IN      CNAME   a
+deleg			IN		NS		ns01.deleg
+				IN		DS		18512 13 2 D4E806322598BC97A003EF1ACDFF352EEFF7B42DBB0D41B8224714C36AEF08D9
+unsigned		IN		NS		ns01.deleg
+`