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			151 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.7 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Groff
		
	
	
	
	
	
| .\" Generated by Mmark Markdown Processer - mmark.miek.nl
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| .TH "COREDNS-TSIG" 7 "July 2022" "CoreDNS" "CoreDNS Plugins"
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| 
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| .SH "NAME"
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| .PP
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| \fItsig\fP - validate TSIG requests and sign responses.
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| 
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| .SH "DESCRIPTION"
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| .PP
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| With \fItsig\fP, you can define a set of TSIG secret keys for validating incoming TSIG requests and signing
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| responses. It can also require TSIG for certain query types, refusing requests that do not comply.
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| 
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| .SH "SYNTAX"
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| .PP
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| .RS
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| 
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| .nf
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| tsig [ZONE...] {
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|   secret NAME KEY
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|   secrets FILE
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|   require [QTYPE...]
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| }
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| 
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| .fi
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| .RE
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| 
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| .IP \(bu 4
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| \fBZONE\fP - the zones \fItsig\fP will TSIG.  By default, the zones from the server block are used.
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| .IP \(bu 4
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| \fB\fCsecret\fR \fBNAME\fP \fBKEY\fP - specifies a TSIG secret for \fBNAME\fP with \fBKEY\fP. Use this option more than once
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| to define multiple secrets. Secrets are global to the server instance, not just for the enclosing \fBZONE\fP.
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| .IP \(bu 4
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| \fB\fCsecrets\fR \fBFILE\fP - same as \fB\fCsecret\fR, but load the secrets from a file. The file may define any number
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|  of unique keys, each in the following \fB\fCnamed.conf\fR format:
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| 
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| .PP
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| .RS
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| 
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| .nf
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|  key "example." {
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|      secret "X28hl0BOfAL5G0jsmJWSacrwn7YRm2f6U5brnzwWEus=";
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|  };
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| 
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| .fi
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| .RE
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| 
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| 
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| Each key may also specify an \fB\fCalgorithm\fR e.g. \fB\fCalgorithm hmac-sha256;\fR, but this is currently ignored by the plugin.
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| 
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| .RS
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| .IP \(en 4
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| \fB\fCrequire\fR \fBQTYPE...\fP - the query types that must be TSIG'd. Requests of the specified types
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| will be \fB\fCREFUSED\fR if they are not signed.\fB\fCrequire all\fR will require requests of all types to be
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| signed. \fB\fCrequire none\fR will not require requests any types to be signed. Default behavior is to not require.
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| 
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| .RE
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| 
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| 
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| .SH "EXAMPLES"
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| .PP
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| Require TSIG signed transactions for transfer requests to \fB\fCexample.zone\fR.
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| 
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| .PP
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| .RS
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| 
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| .nf
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| example.zone {
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|   tsig {
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|     secret example.zone.key. NoTCJU+DMqFWywaPyxSijrDEA/eC3nK0xi3AMEZuPVk=
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|     require AXFR IXFR
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|   }
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|   transfer {
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|     to *
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|   }
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| }
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| 
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| .fi
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| .RE
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| 
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| .PP
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| Require TSIG signed transactions for all requests to \fB\fCauth.zone\fR.
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| 
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| .PP
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| .RS
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| 
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| .nf
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| auth.zone {
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|   tsig {
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|     secret auth.zone.key. NoTCJU+DMqFWywaPyxSijrDEA/eC3nK0xi3AMEZuPVk=
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|     require all
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|   }
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|   forward . 10.1.0.2
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| }
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| 
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| .fi
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| .RE
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| 
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| .SH "BUGS"
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| .SS "ZONE TRANSFER NOTIFIES"
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| .PP
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| With the transfer plugin, zone transfer notifications from CoreDNS are not TSIG signed.
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| 
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| .SS "SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FORWARDING SERVERS (RFC 8945 5.5)"
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| .PP
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| https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8945#section-5.5
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| \[la]https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8945#section-5.5\[ra]
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| 
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| .PP
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| CoreDNS does not implement this section as follows ...
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| 
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| .IP \(bu 4
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| RFC requirement:
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| > If the name on the TSIG is not
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| of a secret that the server shares with the originator, the server
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| MUST forward the message unchanged including the TSIG.
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| 
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| 
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| .PP
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| CoreDNS behavior:
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| If ths zone of the request matches the \fItsig\fP plugin zones, then the TSIG record
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| is always stripped. But even when the \fItsig\fP plugin is not involved, the \fIforward\fP plugin
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| may alter the message with compression, which would cause validation failure
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| at the destination.
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| 
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| .IP \(bu 4
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| RFC requirement:
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| > If the TSIG passes all checks, the forwarding
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| server MUST, if possible, include a TSIG of its own to the
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| destination or the next forwarder.
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| 
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| 
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| .PP
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| CoreDNS behavior:
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| If ths zone of the request matches the \fItsig\fP plugin zones, \fIforward\fP plugin will
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| proxy the request upstream without TSIG.
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| 
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| .IP \(bu 4
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| RFC requirement:
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| > If no transaction security is
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| available to the destination and the message is a query, and if the
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| corresponding response has the AD flag (see RFC4035) set, the
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| forwarder MUST clear the AD flag before adding the TSIG to the
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| response and returning the result to the system from which it
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| received the query.
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| 
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| 
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| .PP
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| CoreDNS behavior:
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| The AD flag is not cleared.
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| 
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